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34 
Dignity as Perception: Recognition of the 
Human Individual and the Individual Animal 
in Legal Thought 
Joseph Jlining1 
Human dignity and forms of thought 
'To THEIR MURDERERS THESE wretched people were not individuals at all. They 
came in wholesale lots and were treated worse than animals.' This was Telford 
Taylor, beginning the presentation of the 'Medical Case' at the Nuremberg 
Trials after the Second World War.2 The 'Medical Case' was not about geno-
cide or war or the conduct of war. It was about experimentation on human be-
ings; and it was this trial that produced the 'Nuremberg Code' , the first control 
of such treatment of human beings by one another. 
The word 'individual' came naturally to Taylor the lawyer as a starting 
point, and with it the contrast with animals. The connection between what 
kind of treatment these units of flesh and blood might receive, and whether 
they were individuals 'at all', came naturally to him too. 
Taylor's opening at Nuremberg echoed the Nazi representative Joseph 
Goebbels' explanation in 1938 of German programmes of eugenic steriliza-
tion and euthanasia, themselves experiments. 'Our starting point is not the 
individual', Goebbels said.3 He knew that this was the critical point in thought 
and then action, and he knew just what Taylor meant later by 'individual'. 
1 In this chapter I have drawn particularly on material in my Giannella Memorial Lecture, 'The mys-
tery of the individual in modern law', at the Villanova University School of Law, Villanova Law Re-
view 52 (2007), 1. I am indebted to James Boyd White and Christopher McCrudden for their detailed 
and helpful comments. 
2 Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 
JO, October 1946-Apri/ 1949: The Medical Case, vol. I (Washington DC, US Government Printing 
Office), 27-8. 
3 US Holocaust Memorial Museum, Deadly Medicine: Creating the Master Race (Chapel Hill, Uni-
versity of North Carolina Press, 2004), 8, citing Michael Burleigh and Wolfgang Wippermann, The 
Racial State: Germany 1933-1945 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991), 69). 
Proceedings of the British Academy, 191, 573-590. IC The British Academy 2013. 
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. With an inversion of a biblical passage that would be well known, Goebbels 
made explicit the implication of not starting with the individual: '[A]nd we 
do not subscribe', he said, 'to the view that one should feed the hungry, give 
drink to the thirsty or clothe the naked ... Our objectives are entirely different: 
We must have a healthy people in order to prevail in the world. '4 
We know the word 'individual' in Taylor's reference, or in Joseph Goeb-
bels', is not referring merely to a unit, something discrete, an atom, a particle. 
Moving from units separate but interchangeable to the particulars of the expe-
rienced world that are each and always unique does not take us to the indi-
vidual either. It takes us only to the little pebble or the rusting old car which 
there is nothing in the universe exactly like. The uniqueness of a living thing 
is just that, of pebble or rusty car, ifit is only the product of those familiar ele-
ments of genetic nature and environmental nurture, the two poles of modem 
inquiry typically presented as exhausting the sources of living particularity. 
Biological parlance has a special name for that product, the phenotype, which 
is the current state of the mutual interaction of internal system and external 
system. Seeing the individual is looking in reality to something else besides, 
a third element. 
What did the twentieth century threaten in the deepest way? What were 
those who eventually prevailed at such staggering cost fighting to protect? 
What was the great twentieth-century struggle about? The individual, and 
spirit itself, seen in us in being seen as an individual. The individual and spirit: 
they are linked, and their absence together defines the world of those two 
books emblematic of what the twentieth century might have brought, 19845 
and Brave New World.6 
The home in the secular world for both these, the individual and spirit, 
is the legal mind and the legal form of thought. Both these connect law with 
religious sensibility and its work in us and in the world-the sensibility that 
the human, the human at least, if not also the sentience of other creatures, is 
spoken to and touched from beyond the world of the here and now. And it 
is the legal mind, rooted in and the possession of people in circles out and 
out from those professionally involved with it, that can protect humanity 
and the rest of the sentient world from reliving the twentieth century in the 
twenty-first. 
The presence of the individual in modem law runs counter to the thrust 
of what are called 'modem' efforts to understand the world. The individual 
• US Holocaust Memorial Museum, Deadly Medicine. 
• George Orwell, 1984 (London, Secker & Warburg, 1949). 
• Aldous Huxley, Brave New World (London, Chatto & Windus, 1932). 
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is associated with openness, each individual new and a new source of under-
standing by others of the world, 'world without end', as the phrase goes; while 
modem thought presses towards finality of understanding, 'theories of every-
thing', 'final . theories'. The individual human being's use of language is a 
source of newness and meaning, with translation of it on a presupposition of 
identity despite difference-more than presupposition, a sense of identity-
that makes each of us a gift to the other. 7 
The individual is the carrier of creativity in the actual world. Creativity 
comes into the world despite views of the world, voiced of course by individu-
als, that have no place for creativity, in which everything in the world, and all 
thought itself, is the product of units of some sort operating by rules of some 
sort, Newtonian or post-Newtonian. The modem future, it is said, must be in 
principle predictable as the product of what has gone before, probabilistically 
or otherwise, even if it cannot in fact be predicted because ofnon-computabil-
ity or some other inadequacy in our technical equipment. There simply is no 
creative force operating at any level to point to or produce what comes in the 
world unfolding before us. But-we see it every day-with each of us there 
comes into being a whole world. 
Individual animals 
The recognition of individuality in animals illustrates what perception of the 
human individual does in thought and means in practice. Taylor spoke of the 
wretched in the laboratories at Dachau or Buchenwald as not individuals 'at 
all' . They were treated 'worse than animals', 'as less than beasts'.8 Nearly 
fifty years later in the USA, it appeared that chimpanzees had not proved 
as suitable a model as expected for AIDS research, both in themselves and 
because of their expense--and also, interestingly, because of widespread and 
persistent opposition to their use. The question what to do with those that 
remained came to the National Research Council Committee on Long-Term 
Care of Chimpanzees, and eventually to the US Congress. 
The minority statement of the National Research Council Committee took 
the view that euthanasia of some was 'an appropriate strategy for maximizing 
the quality of life of the remaining population while facilitating the continued 
7 For some exploration, on my part, of the connection between the individual and the meaning of 
language, see Joseph Vining, 'Fuller and language', in Willem J. Witteveen and Wibrcn van der Burg 
(eds), Rediscovering Fuller: Essays on Implicit Law and Institutional Design (Amsterdam, Amster-
dam University Press, 1999), 453- 78. 
1 Trials of War Criminals, 27~. 
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production of chimpanzees to fulfill critical needs in biomedical and behav-
ioral research'. It observed, 'O]ust as the viability of the species rather than 
of individual animals is proposed as the primary motivation for management 
strategies in the zoo situation', here 'the long-tenn viability of the resource 
for addressing biomedical research needs should be the primary concern'. 9 
The majority, however, observed that the 'phylogenetic status and psycho-
logical complexity of chimpanzees indicate that they should be accorded a 
special status with regard to euthanasia that might not apply to other research 
animals', and that while not '"the moral equivalent" of humans ... they are 
more like humans than other laboratory species might be with respect to some 
features relevant to the question of euthanasia' .10 
This led to a US Senate Report adopting the majority position and to the 
federal Chimpanzee Health Improvement, Maintenance, and Protection Act 
of 20QO, 11 which set up a federal sanctuary for them, and provided not only 
that once in the sanctuary they could not be transferred out and any experi-
mentation on them would be subject to limitations more stringent than those 
governing experimentation on human children, but, further, that 'none of the 
chimpanzees may be subjected to euthanasia, except as in the best interests of 
the chimpanzee involved'. 12 
The 'best interests of the chimpanzee involved'. The animal emerges as 
an individual here, and, I may say, from time to time elsewhere in law even 
when the animal is phylogenetically 'below' the higher primates. The indi-
vidual when recognized begins to block weighing of costs and benefits, jus-
tification by relative numbers, thinking in terms of systems and processes, 
'at the start' to use Goebbels' phrase.13 It is this blockage, this shift in kind 
of thinking, that is signalled when we begin to speak of an individual 'right'. 
The connection between recognition of a being (including a being that is 
human) as an individual, and the possession of a 'right', an 'individual' right, 
draws on the image of property, the castle or the cottage, security within it, 
9 Commission on Long-Tenn Care of Chimpanzees, Institute for Laboratory Animal Research, Com-
mission on Life Sciences, and National Research Council, Chimpanzees in Resean:h: Strategies for 
Their EthicaT Care, Managemelll, and Use (Washington DC, National Academies Press, 1997), 88, 92. 
'° Commission on Long-Tenn Care of Chimpanzees, Chimpanzees in Research, 38-9. 
" Senate Report No. 106-494, p. 2 (2000); Chimpanzee Health Improvement, Maintenance, and Pro-
tection Act, Pub. L. No. 106-551, §481C(d)(2), 114 Stat. 2753 (2000). 
12 Chimpanzee Health Improvement, Maintenance, and Protection Act §481C(d)(2XI), §481C(d)(3); 
Code of Federal Regulations Part 46-Protection of Human Subjects, Subpart D--' Additional Protec-
tions for Children Involved as Subjects in Research', 45 Code of Federal Regulations 46.401-9. The 
protections for chimpanzees in sanctuary are both substantive and procedural. The ultimate protec-
tions for children are procedural only, coupled with a directive to be ethical. 
13 US Holocaust Memorial Museum, Deadly Medicine, 8. 
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and dominion over it. A 'right' is said sometimes to dispose of other consid-
erations. Those who work with legal argument and legal reasoning know that 
a right is not a thing, bundled or unbundled, that one holds in one's hand in 
advance of legal argument or a legal proceeding. Lawyers know that whether 
or not one will be 'found' to have a right is determined by argument on the 
merits in which public values are considered, 'weighed' we say, and the value 
reflected in the putative right-holder's argument may not outweigh the rest. 
But in some cases what is represented by the words 'individual right' is dis-
positive and holds back the arguments of others. No torture is an example, if 
the individual is a human being. 14 No slavery-for instance under the Thir-
teenth Amendment of the United States Constitution-may be another, looked 
to recently when the US Patent Office declared unpatentable a proposed 
being that would be grown to maturity after blending human and chimpanzee 
genetic material. 15 In Canada, under charters of rights, no absolute denial of 
medical care to a human being in a time of pain may be another.16 No human 
experimentation without true consent may be gradually emerging as another, 
now two generations after Nuremberg17-Article 3(b) of the 2005 UNESCO 
Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights provides that '[t]he 
interests and welfare of the individual should have priority over the sole inter-
est of science or society' .18 
When this happens, in the case of an animal or a human being, under-
standing what is happening must involve shifting focus to the recognition of 
the individual. It is not the possession of a right but the effect of perceiving 
one as an individual that holds back the claims of the rest of the world. Nor 
is it suffering that does it. We use metaphors of quantity as we contemplate 
and speak of suffering as more or less, as acute, extreme, unbearable, or mild. 
1
• I. Herman Burgers and Hans Danelius, The United Nations Convention Against Torlllre (Dordrccht, 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1988), 114-19, 123-4. 
15 Rick Weiss, 'U.S. denies patent for a too-human hybrid', Washington Post (13 February 2005), 
A03; Aaron Zitner, 'Patently provoking a debate', Los Angeles Tunes (12 May 2002), Al (discussing 
part-human, part-mouse hybrid); Consolidated Appropriations Act (United States), Pub. L. No. 108-
99, §634, 118 Stat. 3, 101 (2004) (providing that no funds could be 'used to issue patents on claims 
directed to or encompassing a human organism'). 
16 Chaoulli v Quebec, 2005, 1 S.C.R. 791. Cf. Case C-372/04, The Queen, on the Application of'Yvonne 
Watts v Bedford Primary Care Trost, Secretary of State for Health (European Court of Justice, 16 May 
2006), http://curia.europa.eu/en/content/juris/index.htm (addressing issue in European Union). 
17 For example, Burton v Brooklyn Doctors Hospital, 452 N.Y.S.2d 875, 881 {N.Y. App. Div. 1982); In 
re Cincinnati Radiation Litigation, 874 F. Supp. 796, 819-22 (S.D. Ohio 1995). The various utilitar-
ian justifications for dispensing with true consent, such as scientific knowledge, medical advance, or 
military effectiveness, were forcefully argued at Nuremberg, and are argued still. 
11 General Conference of UNESCO, 33d Session, Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human 
Rights, Article 3(2), 19 October 2005. 
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Metaphors of quantity appear again when we detach suffering from individual 
experience and seem to aggregate it. In utilitarian reasoning, the amount of 
suffering of one would be put against the amount of suffering that could be 
prevented or alleviated for others alive or to be born. But on any supposed 
calculus of suffering, the suffering of one would be a drop in the oceans of the 
world's present suffering, human, animal, that is now connected with life and 
that only death fully eliminates, and not even a drop but barely an atom when 
placed against the eons of suffering that might be alleviated or prevented in 
the future, human and animal. In fact, we can see that the suffering of one can 
be as great as the suffering of all the world, the point made in the proposed 
bargain for the happiness forever of all mankind in the passage preceding 
the Grand Inquisitor scene in The Brothers Karamazov19 and made, I think, 
at every celebration of the Eucharist. But in seeing that, we are seeing the 
individual. 
We can foreground what it is, in law, to recognize an animal as an indi-
vidual, by asking the kinds of questions we used to hear in the mid-twentieth 
century as we were contemplating 'nuclear winter'. Would the death of all 
human beings be a loss? I think we would say yes, and not that humanity's 
passing would merely be evolution at work. Would the death of a group of 
human beings, leaving behind a 'remaining population' that might benefit 
from resources freed up, be a loss? Again, we would say yes. Would the death 
of a single human being be a loss? Again, we would say yes, a loss not only 
to other individuals who knew or individually valued him or her but to the 
world, and we express that in so many ways, not least the real impossibility, 
the acknowledged fiction, of calculating a measurement or monetary value of 
a single human life so that human lives could conceivably come in Taylor's 
'wholesale lots' .20 
So, in the same vein, would the death of all animals, or all of a kind of 
animal-extinction we call it-be a loss? Ifwe said yes, rather than that this 
is only evolution at work, I think our minds would most likely be focused 
on the ecological and the environmental, on systems that support the sys-
tems within us. But is the death of a single animal a loss to the world? To 
the extent an animal is an individual at all, we may begin to feel pressure 
within and pull from without to say yes, as we do contemplating the death 
of a single human being. 
19 Fyodor Dostoyevsky, The Brothers Karamcuov, trans. Constance Garnett (New York, Vintage Press, 
1955), 219. 
2
• Trials of War Criminals, 27-8. 
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The pressure and pull from recognition of the individual is there in the 
legal mind, and has its effect whether or not it holds back other concerns and 
claims in the definitive way it does when torture or slavery are proposed. 
It was natural to Taylor at Nuremberg to say 'not individuals at all' as he 
presented humans conceived as 'less than beasts' .21 There is a metaphorical 
'degree' in 'at all'-and in 'pressure' or 'pull'. But what is happening is blunt-
ing, slowing, and interfering with thinking that is quantitative, as so much of 
our thought is and necessarily is, capturing in definitions, categorising, unitiz-
ing, systematizing, and calculating. Modem thought-your mind and min~ 
moves quickly to systems, and to units that can fit into a system. The pres-
sure recognition of the individual introduces is instead towards imaginative 
escapes, reconfigurations, compromises that are temporary, facing the tragic 
in tragic choices made, and moving into the world of remorse, forgiveness, 
and beginning again to which calculation is utterly foreign. 
The effect is easily seen, familiar really, in criminal law both as formu-
lated and as applied. Judges, prosecutors, juries, legislators all feel it. The 
classic holding back of what is proposed to be done to a human convict for 
purposes of general deterrence, the insistence that a criminal sanction be 
linked in some proportional way to the mind condemned, is a turning of 
decisional attention to the individual who is at the mercy of the decision-
maker. When we say the 'retributive' purpose of a criminal sanction limits its 
utilitarian use, it is this to which we are referring. Procedure and procedural 
choices are affected throughout criminal law, as are the placing and rela-
tive heaviness of burdens of proof. ' Strict' or 'vicarious' criminal liability 
introduced in the aptly named public policy offences, apparently eliminat-
ing any inquiry at all into the mind and particular situation of an individual 
before criminal condemnation, is demonstrably moulded into liability that is 
neither strict nor vicarious. The more serious the proposed suffering of the 
individual, the greater is insistence on such inquiry, constitutionally pushed 
by the very notion of 'law' in 'due process of law' and in the USA by the 
constitutional word 'cruel'. 
Then, on the animal side: in criminal law, inquiry into the justification 
for the actions of human beings accused of the felony of animal cruelty is 
pulled and moulded by the suffering of animals without regard to number. 
Medical and scientific experimentation is institutionalized and regulated by 
statute. In the USA the legal mandate runs to federal mini-agencies called 
Institutional Animal Care and Use Committees, established to approve or 
disapprove research proposals and 'represent society's concerns regarding 
11 Trials of War Criminals, 27-8 {emphasis added). 
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the welfare of animal subjects' .22 It is a mandate to researchers as well, and 
it focuses on individual animals. The absolute number of animals suffering 
is to be reduced to the lowest number possible, not the percentage of the 
kind but the absolute number. Experimental technique and procedure are to 
be refined to lessen each animal's suffering. Then, as a training manual for 
members of the enforcement committees instructs, '[f]inally, there comes a 
point in a number of research studies in which further pain and suffering by 
the animal is unjustified, no matter how noble the cause. It is the [commit-
tee's] role to recognize when this point bas come and end the research trial 
at this time.'23 
In Canadian and US trusts and estates law, an animal moves on its own-
er's death out from under the general law of property and into the world of 
wills acts and probate codes. There are now cases in which courts have voided 
an order put into a will to destroy an animal left behind, fashioning some-
thing like a temporary judicial sanctuary for it, when a challenge to the order 
as against basic legal values is brought by an executor or an intervenor or, 
indeed, by the state attorney general.24 The Uniform Trust Code in the USA 
now provides for trusts for an animal effective for its life, in which the animal 
is an equitable beneficiary, and persons interested in the animal's welfare are 
given standing to intervene and seek enforcement of the terms of the trust.25 
Time and again attention is paid to the individual animal, quite apart from any 
ecological, environmental, or species-preservation concerns. It is recognized, 
it presses, as if in law it can look you directly in the eye. 
Consideration of the individual animal can help us focus upon and titrate 
out, as it were, the third element to which I have referred. What evokes the 
human response of 'respect' is not entirely contained in what we call 'the 
n 7 United States Code §§2132(n), 2143(b)(1) ('Animal Welfare Act' of 1966 as amended); Congres-
sional Finding (4) for Pub. L. No. 99--198, §§2142-6, 99 Stat. 1645 (1985). 
23 Sally K. Wixson, 'The role of the IACUC in assessing and managing pain and distress in research 
animals', in M. Lawrence Podolsky and Victor S. Lukas (eds), The Care and Feeding of an IA CUC: 
The Orga11ization arui Management of an Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee (Boca Raton, 
FL, CRC Press, 1999), 115, 117. The Animal Welfare Act itself now prohibits, for any animal it covers, 
surgery using paralytics without anesthetics. The prohibition is absolute, without regard to motive or 
context 7 United States Code §2143(aX3XC)(iv) (1985). 
24 For example, Capers Estate, 340 D. and C.2d 121, 135-38 (Orphan's Court PA, 1964); In the Matter 
of the Estate of Clive Wishart, 129 N.B.R.(2d) 397, 401-2, 408-9, 412-24 (New Bnmswick Court 
of Queen's Bench [Canada], 1992), reviewing both US and Canadian law. For discussion, see Sonia 
S. WaislDllll, Pamela D. Frasch and Bruce A. Wagman, Animal Law: Cases and Materials, 3rd edn 
(Durham, NC, Carolina Academic Press, 2006), 587- 98 . 
.,, Uniform Trust Code (United States) §408 (2005); Official Commentary to §408 ('The concept of 
granting standing to a person with a demonsttated interest in the animal's welfare is derived from the 
Uniform Guardianship and Protective Proceedings Act, which allows a person interested in the we!· 
fare of a ward or protected person to file petitions on behalf of the ward or protected person'.) 
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human'. 'The individual' is not merely an expression of human self-regard. 
Noting this can uncouple us somewhat from the growing question about what 
is human and what is not, being raised by experimental work with embryonic 
stem cells, genetic engineering, and the hybridization of human and animal 
systems. It can even buffer us from the impossible question of relative degrees 
of human-likeness in legal categorizations of animals based on likenesses 
between human and animal physical systems, which is cousin to the impos-
sible question of degrees of perfection within humanness in current eugenic 
discussion of 'selection in' or 'termination' using the tools of reproductive 
technology. 
The individual and the person 
Consideration of the individual that is an animal also pulls us away from mis-
talcing the recognition and experience of the individual for the experience 
of persons. An animal may be an individual but not a person. On the human 
side, a slave may be property, a thing bought and sold, flogged and kicked, 
not a citizen or a legal person, thought even to be 'not fully human', but a 
slave presses nonetheless for entry into the perceived world as an individual. 26 
To allude again to the biological manipulation that is now possible, the tem-
poral line often drawn between using a developing human unit in scientific 
experimentation, and staying the hand at using it in experimentation, is the 
fourteenth day of embryonic development.27 One of the reasons advanced for 
that line is the possibility of twinning before fourteen days and the challenge 
it may pose to perception of an individual until that possibility is past.28 For 
many who would adopt that line, the individual after fourteen days is not yet 
a person. Then at the end of life, the person may fade away. The individual 
u For a sweeping examination of the nonnality of slavery before the recent past, and of what is seen 
when a slave is seen, and for the history of the development of perception leading to a prohibition of 
slavery that is 'absolute', see John T. Noonan Jr, A Ch11rch that Can and Cannot Change: The Devel-
opment of Catholic Moral Teaching (South Bend, TN, University of Notre Dame Press, 2005), 3- 123. 
ri Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990, chapter 37, §3(3). (4) (Great Britain); National 
Research Council and Institute of Medicine. Guidelines for H11man Embryonic Stem Cell Research 
(Washington DC, National Academies Press, 2005), 57 (United States). 
21 National Institutes of Health, Report of the H11man Embryo Research Panel, vol. 1 (Bethesda, MD, 
National Institutes of Health, 1994), 45-7, 65, 67; Anthony Kenny, 'Life stories: when an individual 
life be~d the ethics of ending it', 1lmes Literary Supplement (25 March 2005), 3, 4 (quoting 
from Parliamentary Debates, 6th Ser., vol. 73, 15 February 1985, 682, remarks to the House of Com-
mons by Kenneth Clarke, Minister for Health in Great Britain). The fourtecn-<lay point is also the 
point after which appear ' the precursors of the brain and central nervous system'. National Research 
Council and Institute of Medicine, Guidelines, 55. 
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stays-whom you do not experiment on or 'harvest' from-though the person 
fades. The individual is centred on the flesh, though that is something with 
which we do struggle, the continuing challenge of gnosticism in Christianity 
being only a more than usually clear example of struggle with it.29 
Questions about how to use the terms 'individual' and 'person' are 
unsettled, but the terms as used do reflect an underlying sense of the differ-
ence between a person and an individual, indeed the difference between a 
person centred on an individual's body and the individual enfleshed there.30 
A person, both in mundane or ordinary or daily or unself-conscious talk, 
and in the considered language of law, may be enfleshed. But a person need 
not be enfleshed and can speak through one or another individual. We can 
and do take on various legal identities without losing our individuality: they 
are not identities all our own. Persons join us together, and the standard 
assumption, that one can always be challenged when one speaks on behalf 
of a person who is not an individual, is evidence of such joining rather than 
separation. Identification with persons who are not individuals is what links 
us, in a real way, to future individuals beyond our span oflife, even the dis-
tant future, with responsibility to them and hope for them. It is what links 
us, in obligation and gratitude, to individuals before our individual time, 
indeed what makes the past even relevant and interesting to us so that we are 
willing to spend precious individual time, the most wasting resource there 
is, working to determine what is authentic in our understanding of the past, 
and what is unreal. 
As for the 'individual person', this is mutually developed in our con-
scious and unconscious understanding and experience over time. Other indi-
viduals continually sift and sort through what an individual says and does as 
an individual, identifying it with him or her as a person who exists over time, 
or putting it aside as mistake or inauthentic. We do the same with ourselves, 
doubting or trusting, persuading ourselves and believing. We sit in judgment 
on what we ourselves say and do. 
The person perceived or heard is 'half-created' over time, real and alive 
to us because of our work, something of our own. The individual is always 
in the present. If time moves or if one moves through time, the individual is 
always with us. Anything said is always in the past, immediately so, evidence 
with which we work, but evidence only, not the same as what it is evidence 
l 9 Philip 1. Lee, Against the Protestant Gnostics (New York, Oxford University Press, 1993}; Walter 
Brueggemann, Praying the Psalms, 2nd edn (Eugene, OR, Cascade Books, 2007}. 
30 I first worked on these problems, against the background of twentieth-century developments in 
'standing', in Joseph Vining, Legal Identity: The Coming of Age of Public Law (New Haven, Yale 
University Press, 1978), 2-3, 6-7, 145--8, 179--81. 
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of. The individual here and now is silent and lives with us in silence. As 'start-
ing point', the individual always remains central. The person prevents the 
individual as starting point, this ongoing centrality, from ending in radical 
ignorance and isolation, solipsism and relativism.31 
Articulating perception 
But again, the third element, beyond systems internal and external, is what 
gives the individual its distinctive force in perception and action. This is what 
so demands to be fitted into our ongoing effort to put together the bits and 
pieces of our experience into a coherence that does not close the eyes to any 
of it. Without this third element, the individual's place in the worlds of other 
individuals would not be begun to be understood. Even ifthere is no real pos-
sibility-precisely because of the recognition of the individual-of anyone's 
tying up understanding of individuality into a finished package by the end of 
his or her life in the world, still our trying to articulate the perception on which 
we act can serve a purpose. It helps each of us in opening a door, moving to 
the side of systems in general, and stepping once more into the parts of the 
mind where quantification and calculation lose purchase. 
Some might reach for the term used in professional philosophy, 'agency', 
to refer to this third element. But agency is too pale and neutral a term to 
evoke the force that recognition of the individual has, and this is because 
agency in its connotations remains attached to its origins in philosophic dis-
cussion and to language there that speaks of properties of units and emergent 
properties of systems of units, envisioning capturing all parts of experience, 
unitizing them so that they can be put in classes and groups of the same, and 
then manipulating them in ways logical or otherwise-rather than listening to 
them. Agents need not call as individuals do, appeal, stop, reveal as individu-
als do. Agency tames experience. 
What to call the third element? The American pragmatist Richard Rorty 
summed up in the most wonderful way much of what we try to talk about in 
his response to a 1999 request for reflections upon the coming third millen-
nium. He looked to 'accomplishing' a 'thorough-going secularization' before 
the fourth millennium. 'It will probably talce ', he said, 'at least a thousand 
years for human beings to give up the last remnants of the idea that they 
31 
'Half-create' is Wordsworth's-'all the mighty world/Of eye and ear, both what they half-create,! 
And what perceive'. William Wordsworth, 'Lines written a few miles above Tintem Abbey', in Ste-
phen Gill (ed.), William Wordsworth: The Major Works (New York, Oxford University Press, 2000), 
134. 
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contain a spark of the divine: to see Beethoven and Jefferson as animals with 
extra neurons. ' 32 He went on to speak of individuals in modern history who 
have 'unwittingly collaborated with each other . .. to force us' to this conclu-
sion about the nature of the sources oflife and thought given us when we enter 
the world for our time in it. Rorty, so oblivious, it seems, to the phenomenon 
of human law and its recognitions, and so oblivious to what might be his own 
commitment to law's recognitions, and certainly his dependence on them in 
his life taken as a whole, calls the third element a ' spark of the divine' in deny-
ing it to both human and animal. 
We have called the third element spirit here, rather than spark of the 
divine. Sparks go out, spirit continues. Sparks are units, spirit is not captur-
able. And it is because spirit is not capturable and is not predictable, ahd takes 
form in the human world in language the meaning of which is the meaning of 
its utterer and itself irreducible to any system, that spirit stands against the full 
thrust of thought that is distinctively twentieth century. 
Not against thought of a religious kind, that continued through the 
century, not against legal thought, that has if anything flourished33 and 
become more central to human life as the number of human individuals 
has increased, and not against 'ordinary' thought of 'ordinary' individuals: 
spirit stands against thought that, because in its own terms it has no place for 
spirit, would squeeze spirit out from thought itself, against elite, informed 
thought that views success in manipulating the systems of the world to 
human ends as authority to teach the nature of the world as a whole. Dis-
tinctively twentieth-century thought is cosmological, agitatedly and aggres-
sively so, and thus for many, not most but many, one aspect of the mystery 
of the individual in modem law is the individual being there at all after the 
twentieth century. 
Full recognition of the individual human being may be described, and I 
think in a way not inconsistent with spirit being the third element, as accept-
ing into one's world something analogous to the acceptance of the Big Bang 
into physics and into contemplation of the physical world. The individual is a 
singularity, a word nicely taken over by physicists from their own experience 
of being individuals- not a unit playing a part in the working of rules and 
quantities governed by rules. Each individual has a view of the reality of the 
world, the cosmos itself, that cannot be different from his or her view. One 
32 Richard Rorty, ' International books of the year-41nd the millennium', 1imes Literary Supplement 
(2 December 1999), 11. 
31 Steven D. Smith, Law:S Quandary (Cambridge, MA, Harvard Univenity Press, 2004). See Steven 
D. Smith, The Disenchantment of Secular Discourse (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 
2010), 205-10, for further discussion of'spirit' as used here. 
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cannot say, 'I see the world in this way or see this in the world, but what I see 
is mistaken or an illusion.' One sees it the way one sees it. One can struggle 
with doubt and be open to change if open-minded and working with percep-
tions that themselves open out into the new and surprising. But one cannot 
truthfully say to another, 'The way you see the world is true, not the way I see 
the world.' Even if one hears oneself saying such a thing, the world remains 
the way one sees it, and another individual, who is only one, trying to dismiss 
it with the word 'solipsism', is merely denying that one is an individual like 
himself or herself. 
When individuals are recognized by one another they acknowledge this 
sense on the part of each that each is at the centre of the world. The 'pub-
lic' value of an individual life is bedrock-natural rather than a mysterious 
anomaly. 'Not for all the world', we say, and thought of 'all the world' and 
reference to 'all the world' is a quite understandable and common response 
to a proposal that something be done to an individual, a meaningful response, 
not hyperbole or nonsense. It is this ontological or cosmological sense, not of 
the smallness of the individual among the billions but of the largeness of the 
individual up to the level of the largeness of the world itself, that lies behind 
the blocking or blunting or continuous creative compromise with the kind of 
thinking, often called rational, that must work with fungible units. Since each 
ofus is an individual, a cosmology that has a place for us will always be truer, 
or closer to truth, or have a greater claim to truth, than any cosmology that 
does not. 
All this comes before and is not supplanted by the joining of individuals 
in persons and in the experience of living value. The first question of under-
standing each of us faces is not how can I be an individual or how could there 
possibly be an individual, but how can there be more than individuals, as there 
is, and how, in what can only be continuous acts of generosity, do we each see 
we are one among many? 
However paradoxical such a sense of reality or such a cosmology may 
appear to be, and whatever the way it differs from consistently radical sub-
jectivity on the one hand and consistently impersonal objectivity on the other, 
this is the sense of reality displayed to each of us individuals in the practice of 
law, expressed by law, making law possible, underlying what lawyers do. As 
Stephen R. L. Clark says so nicely of objectifying visions: 
Fortunately-<>r providentially--0ur own sense of self, and our sense of sig-
nificant others as individual selves, keeps breaking in. Our attention is always 
being drawn to individuals as something more than episodes or anecdotes 
within a single story. Instead of one world, there are, in a way, very many 
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though each unitary world experiences itself as a fragment or an echo of the 
wider realm. l4 
Trinitarian Christianity has its words for this, and in its ecumenical reach 
seeks to understand the words for it in other enduring religious teachings. It 
is an ontology that, in addition to recognizing the world of each individual, 
recognizes faith in a reality beyond the worlds of each individual, which 
each of us is a new window on and from and for which each of us is a voice 
when we are, as we say, 'really' ourselves, authentic, not pretending, not 
false-a reality in which move the persons who join us and who are half-
created by us all, but only half-created-a reality on which our individual 
action, each of us one among the billions, may have a causal effect neither 
we nor anyone else can trace. 
But all this, internal system, external system, the third element that moves 
a unique unit to individuality, the individual person and the person we half-
create-all can be put aside, and still the individual remains. Happily or 
unhappily, anything I or anyone may say in description of the individual, or 
of the place of the individual in thought, is soft when it comes up against the 
hard reality of the individual. The world just is as you see it and not otherwise. 
When you speak about anything (including about the individual), you just are 
only one speaking. I am and you are prior to our understanding. The past does 
not produce us-we come before the past. The existence, nature, and effects 
of the past are matters for our individual judgment or persuasion throughout 
our lives. Whatever may be thought generally of creation, we each are created, 
for there is no other language of understanding that begins to reach us as indi-
viduals. The current language of emergent properties or of complex adaptive 
systems certainly does not. 
Imaging dignity 
Is spirit what is recognized in an animal also? Is it spirit or an analogue that 
should be given a different name? The third element that moves an animal to 
individuality, with effects on human action similar to those implied whenever 
we speak of human dignity, may not be the same as the third element in the 
human. But as we have noted, the line between what is human and what is not 
may also be less and less secure as experimentation in genetics proceeds. De-
pending upon how strong in our own minds the connection between genetic 
34 Stephen R. L. Clark, Biology and Christian Ethics (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000), 
315-16. Clark speaks of this breaking in as a 'spiritual tension' that 'is echoed in the biological '. 
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patterns and being human is, the phrase 'dignity simply by virtue of being a 
human being' may lose some of its ontological support and usefulness as an 
articulation of perception. Dignity can in fact already be found used in various 
legal contexts in connection with an animaPs-again, an animal and indeed a 
human being need not be a 'legal person' to be seen to be an individual. 
Currently, much of what is perceived and seeks expression clusters around 
an animal's sentience, which is a legal term as much as it is a term in ordinary 
speech or in scientific investigation, 36 and which doubles as expression of a 
line between animals that are seen as individuals and animals that are not. The 
relation between an animal's sentience and our spirit remains to be seen. We 
have only begun to open our eyes to the creatures around us. 
A book I published several years ago had the title The Song Sparrow and 
the Child, 37 with Claims of Science and Humanity as its subtitle. I contrasted 
the song sparrow with the child throughout, and then at the end touched on the 
question how great the difference really was and how long the difference wi11 
continue in our perception, thought, and action. 
Once, while I was working on the book, I opened the US National Sci-
ence Foundation's webpage setting out the call of scientific work, and there 
a song sparrow was on the screen, the first thing seen, with a reference to 
investigation of its neurobiological mechanisms.38 Some of the methods of 
investigation are brutal. What is done to a song sparrow would not be done 
to a child today-though the twentieth century witnessed such things done to 
children where the individual was obscured from view. Song sparrows are of 
Js Christopher McCrudden, 'Human dignity and judicial interpretation of human rights' , European 
Journal of International Law 19 {2008), 708-9 {legal use of' dignity' also with reference to animals). 
u Maine Revised Statute Annotated title 7 §3907 (2001) (United States) ("'Animal" means every liv-
ing, sentient creature not a human being.'); Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European 
Union, the Treaties establishing the European Communities, and certain related acts: Protocol on 
protection and welfare of animals annexed to the Treaty of the European Community Protocol, Official 
Journal C340, 10/11/1997, 0110 {'The high contracting parties, desiring to ensure improved protec-
tion and respect for the welfare of animals as sentient beings, 'have agreed .. . '). See Simon Conway 
Morris, Life~ Solution (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003), a detailed discussion of sci-
entific contributions to recognition of' sentience' in animals; Alasdair Macintyre, Dependent Rational 
Animals: Why Human Beings Need the Virtues {Chicago, Open Court, 2001), for an introduction to 
work in philosophy on the human and the animal that seeks to take into account these contn"butions, 
and individuality; Philip Low et al., The Cambridge Declaration on Consciausness, Francis Crick 
Memorial Conference (7 July 2012), http://fcmconference.org./img/Cambridge DeclarationOnCon-
sciousness.pdf, on consciousness in animals; Barbara Smuts, 'Reflections', in J. M. Coetzee, The 
Lives of Animals {Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1999), I 07-22, on relationships between 
individual human beings and individual animals, and on human-animal intersubjectivity. 
17 Joseph Vming, The Song Sparrow and the Child: Claims of Science and Humanity (Notre Dame, IN, 
Notre Dame University Press, 2004). 
11 National Science Foundation (United States), http://www.nsf.gov/od/lpa/news/publicat/frontier/4-
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particular interest to science, in part because a young song sparrow comes to 
sing a song that is special not just to its kind but to its individual throat and 
tongue-rather like the language of each of us. 
I left the song sparrow to do its own work in the book, and did not spell 
out all the reasons for the choice of this creature rather than another to com-
pare with a child. The song sparrow presented itself, not exotic, as common as 
a child. Its smallness sat with the smallness of the child. It was a dependable 
example because well known, like the standard laboratory mouse. There was 
the echo of its music. 
But beyond this, I can suppose also some part of the attractiveness of the 
sparrow was its resonance with the comparison of human being and sparrow 
in the Gospel of Matthew. Emblems take flight from their origins. Forget-
ting its origin, I had remembered the linkage in the form of a saying, 'Not a 
sparrow that falls but the eye of God is upon it', as in the refrain of the folk 
hymn that Mahalia Jackson and the blues singer Ethel Waters made a signa-
ture piece: 
Why should I feel discouraged? 
Why should the shadows come? 
Why should my heart be lonely, 
And long for heav'n and home? 
I sing because I'm happy. 
I sing because I'm free. 
His eye is on the sparrow 
And I know He watches me.39 
Jt: you go to the original in the Gospel, there will be found a comparison but 
not an equation. The actual words can be something of a surprise: 
A:re not two sparrows sold for a farthing? And one of them shall not fall on the 
ground without your Father. But the very hairs of your head are all numbered. 
Fear ye not therefore, ye are of more value than many sparrows . .o 
A line is drawn between the sparrow and the human being, at least to begin 
with (as in fact we do). The translators ' farthing was the smallest coin, a quar-
ter of a penny (and I recall that when I first saw a modem farthing, before 
decimalization, it was stamped with the image of a small bird). An a fortiori 
" Civilla D. Martin and Charles H. Gabriel, His Eye is on the Sparrow (New York, Hope Publishing, 
1905); Donna Britt, Amazingly. an American in Paris, Washington Post (1 March 1977), D 1, 06; H. C. 
Boyer, 'Commentary', in Mahalia Jackson Gospels, Spirituals, and Hymns {Columbia 47084, 1991), 
25; Laurraine Goreau, Just Mahalia, Baby (Waco, TX, Word Books, 1975), 181, 561; Ethel Waters 
with Charles Samuels, His Eye ls 011 the Sparrow: An Autobiography {Garden City, NY, Doubleday, 
1951). 
40 Matthew 10:29-31 (King James). 
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case builds on an image of the least. One sparrow was not worth even the 
smallest coin, in the market. 
There is a further tension in the original. Every hair, every detail oflife is 
significant; but there is more than a hint of determinism within a concern that 
would value us to the point of counting the hairs on our head. Again, like the 
line between sparrow and human being, we may think this not inappropriate 
as a reflection of our situation. The limit on what we can do and be, the fact 
that we are in systems, is part of what makes a scientist of all of us. Shake-
speare plays on all this when Hamlet, going forward at the end and presenting 
us with decision at last, individual decision, famously remarks to Horatio, 
'There's a special providence in the fall of a sparrow' .41 
But I think that as the image of the sparrow has come down, it has more 
and more represented one of no importance becoming of transcendent impor-
tance. It had appeared long before the Gospel comparison, in the Psalms-the 
altar of God a nesting place for the sparrow.42 Those who first sang 'His eye 
is on the sparrow' included many who knew what it was to be properties, fun-
gible units in a system. Even the hard words of the Gospel shift to the single 
sparrow before returning to the many-there are 'two sparrows' bundled and 
sold for a farthing; it is 'one ' who shall not fall. And the providence that Ham-
let saw in the 'fall of a sparrow' was a special providence. 
For me as for others, including the blues singers who returned to it so 
often, the image blends with the extraordinary statement of human equal-
ity and individual value further along in the Gospel of Matthew,41 which we 
have seen quoted already. It is a radical passage, of which I think the spar-
row can be taken as an emblem. It carries on the oldest prophetic ' tradition 
and demands what seems impossible. It is still today a source of that side of 
the political spectrum we call individualistic. It is read around the globe, in 
unlikely places, by Christian and non-Christian, by scientist and non-scientist. 
And, it must be said, it can have been a source of the kind of totalitarianism 
that begins in an effort to realize it, before closing into the total. It addresses 
both action and inaction, commission and omission, doing with the fiand and 
staying the hand, almost as if in anticipation of modem dilemmas. There is 
hierarchy in it, a 'least'. But then something happens, and happens to 'one'. 
The words are worth reading, for the first time, or again. They end: 
I was an hungred, and ye gave me no meat: I was thirsty, and ye gave me no 
drink: I was a stranger, and ye took me not in: naked, and ye clothed me not: 
4 1 William Shakespeare, Hamlet 5:2 (New Haven, Yale University Press, 2003), 205, 217. 
42 Psalm 84 (King James). 
43 Matthew 25:42-5 (King James). 
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sick, and in prison, and ye visited me not. Then shall they also answer him, 
saying, Lord, when saw we thee an hungred, or athirst, or a stranger, or naked, 
or sick, or in prison, and did not minister unto thee? Then shall he answer 
them, saying, Verily I say unto you, Inasmuch as ye did it not to one of the 
least of these, ye did it not to me. 
One of no importance, the least, can become of transcendent importance. 
